INTRODUCTION
The President, in his message to Congress, decries the runaway inflation in health care costs, the inequities in access to health care, and the variation in the quality of health care across the Nation and across income classes. He champions a novel approach to national health care reform that would rely on market forces to bring disci pline to the health care system. Congress balks and does not give the President what he wants, but in the years that follow, reform is achieved, after a fashion.
A familiar story? The President is, of course, Richard Nixon, conveying a mes sage to Congress in 1971 and pointing out how much the Federal programs con tributed to "this growing investment in health" as a portion of national expendi tures (National Health Insurance Proposals, 1972) . The novel approach he advocates is the "health maintenance stratThe author is with the Office of Strategic Planning, Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA). The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of HCFA.
egy." Unlike a later President's proposalwhich specifically excluded Medicare from the novel managed competition approach-the Nixon Administration's health maintenance strategy would have begun with the then-relatively-new public programs, Medicare and Medicaid. Having started with the Federal Government pro grams, "the government's actions would catalyze similar restructuring in the pri vate, largely employer-financed segment of the health economy that also was having difficulty coping with medical inflation" (Ellwood and Lundberg, 1996) .
Medicare Managed Care in 1965
This historical tidbit illustrates the close ties that exist, or some hoped would exist, between Medicare and managed care. Although in 1965 the term "health mainte nance organization" (HMO) had yet to be coined, what came to be known as HMOs, or their precursors (such as group practice prepayment plans), have been a part of the Medicare program since its inception in 1965. To be more precise, the Medicare program recognized prepaid health care plans as a different kind of entity for which a different kind of payment method was necessary. In 1965, prepaid plans were accommodated by permitting them to be paid on a reasonable cost basis for services (such as physician services) that the pro gram would otherwise be paying on a rea sonable charge basis.
This approach to payment made sense in that, if the HMO-like organization used salaried physicians, there would be no ser vice-by-service billing by the physicians and, therefore, no "charge" other than the aggregate "charge"-a salary-for any and all services rendered by the physician. In choosing between the two available pay ment options that Medicare used in 1965-reasonable charge payments and reason able cost payments-this seemed like a suitable approach, but not necessarily a perfect fit. Thirty-five years later, we are still in search of a "perfect fit" in Medicare's approach to payment of HMOs.
Amendments
The histor y of managed care and Medicare can be described through mile stones that generally coincide with legisla tive history. After 1965, as previously allud ed to, the next major milestone in Medicare HMO provisions was historicin a symbolic sense if not in a practical sense. Although Congress may not have given the then-President everything he asked for, one result of the Nixon Administration's push towards health care reform was passage of the HMO Act of 1973. Before the HMO Act, however, the first Federal legislation in which the term HMO was defined was the Medicare provi sions of the 1972 amendments to the Social Security Act.
The Under a risk-sharing contract, interim payments would be made, and the costs incurred each year by a contracting HMO would be compared with the adjusted aver age per capita cost (AAPCC)-an estimate of program expenses that otherwise would have been incurred for the Medicare bene ficiaries enrolled in the organization. If the organization achieved "savings" in relation to the AAPCC, up to 20 percent of the sav ings would be split equally between the Federal Government and the HMO. Savings in excess of 20 percent would go to the Federal Government. Losses were the responsibility of the HMO, but could be car ried over into subsequent years and offset against savings. Very few HMOs took advantage of this option. In 1979, there were 32 group practice prepayment plans (the pre-existing cost reimbursement option), 32 HMO cost contractors, and only 1 risk-shar ing HMO (Langwell and Hadley, 1989) .
Demonstration Projects
Again, the perfect fit-the right payment methodology for Medicare HMO pay ments-had not been achieved. However, the 1972 amendments also introduced additional authority, beyond that intro duced in 1967, for Medicare demonstration projects of such things as prospective pay ment methods and payment for compre hensive services. Continuing the quest for the perfect payment methodology, in 1980 the Medicare capitation demonstrations began, to be followed by the Medicare competition demonstrations and, eventual ly, the next legislative milestone, the TEFRA risk program.
TEFRA
Other than in demonstration projects, a contracting option for Medicare HMOs operating on a full risk basis would not be available until the changes made by TEFRA were to become effective, which, according to the legislation itself, would be 13 months after enactment or, if later, after "the Secretar y…notifies… [Congress] … that the methodology to make appropriate adjustments…has been developed and can be implemented to assure actuarial equiva lence in the estimation of the adjusted aver age per capita costs." The TEFRA risk con tracting program authorized in 1982 would begin in mid-1985, after publication of the final regulations in January 1985.
Under TEFRA, contracting HMOs or competitive medical plans (which were essentially HMOs that did not have a Federal qualification designation under the HMO Act of 1973) would be paid 95 percent of the AAPCC on a full risk basis. The 5 per cent differential recognized the presumed greater efficiency of HMOs and their abili ty to reduce program expenditures. Any additional savings, determined through a prospective comparison of projected costs with projected AAPCC payments, had to be (a) returned to beneficiaries in the form of extra benefits or reduced cost sharing; or (b) used to fund future additional benefits; or (c) be returned to the Federal Govern ment. HMOs were allowed the normal level of profit, or retained earnings, that they customarily received in the private sector.
There were certain changes to the earli er law. What had been a requirement that no more than 50 percent of an organiza tion's membership could be over the age of 65 became the new 50/50 rule, limiting Medicare and Medicaid enrollment to no more than 50 percent of total enrollmenta provision that could be waived by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Although the open enrollment requirement was continued, Medicare beneficiaries (of any age) with end stage renal disease (ESRD) were prohibited from enrolling in TEFRA HMOs, unless they were already members of the HMO (as pre-existing Medicare enrollees, or as non-Medicare enrollees continuing in the HMO). The cost contracting option continued to be available to HMOs, and HMOs (and other organizations) could continue to be paid under the health care prepayment plan (group practice prepayment plan) option.
AAPCCs were computed for each county of the United States, with separate rates for the disabled and elderly (and statewide rates for ESRD enrollees), and certain adjustment factors were applied to better approximate fee-for-service (FFS) costs: age, sex, institutional status, and Medicaid status. However, there was no direct health status adjuster. As would become evident, the lack of a health status adjuster meant that there was still not a perfect fit in the payment methodology.
The TEFRA program enjoyed a certain level of success in its earliest years. In 1985 there were 480 operating HMOs in the U.S. and 87 Medicare risk contractors. By the end of 1987, the number of risk con tractors rose to 161 (out of 662 operating HMOs [Group Health Association of America, 1993])-the "high water mark" for the first 10 years of the program. Risk enrollment rose in every year, but not very dramatically, from 1.1 million at the end of 1985 to nearly 2 million by the end of 1990.
As measured by beneficiary interest in the program, Medicare managed care, in areas where it was offered and included additional benefits, was a highly successful program. In south Florida, for example, Medicare HMOs offered drug coverage and low out-of-pocket costs through "zero premi um" plans (plans in which enrolled mem bers did not have to pay an additional premi um beyond the Medicare part B premium). The ability to provide additional benefits in certain areas was partly a function of the payment methodology, which recognized the extreme variation in Medicare FFS expenditures in different counties: some counties had per capita costs that were two to three times more than other counties. These payment differences were very visi ble to Medicare beneficiaries, with residents of Minnesota and Massachusetts, for exam ple, less likely to have the kind of added ben efits that were available in the Miami and Los Angeles areas.
Milestone of Another Sort
During the early TEFRA years, the largest Medicare contractor was International Medical Centers (IMC) of Florida, which began as a demonstration project and continued as a TEFRA contrac tor. It consisted almost exclusively Medicare enrollees, operating under the authority of a waiver of the 50/50 rule. The demise of IMC in 1986 was the low point in the history of Medicare managed care. The organization had enrolled over 100,000 Medicare beneficiaries. The fol lowing indicates the drama associated with this particular episode of Medicare man aged care history. This is the text of the FBI international crime alert regarding the head of IMC:
"In 1986, a federal government task force was established to investigate charges of corruption and fraud on the part of Miguel Recarey, Jr. Recarey was then head of International Medical Centers, America's largest health main tenance organization. During its peak years, International Medical Centers received three-hundred sixty million dol lars a year in U.S.-government Medicare funds. In April 1987, the first indictment was returned in Miami, Florida, against Recarey and three co-defendants for con spiracy, bribery, obstruction of justice, and illegal wiretapping." The IMC crisis for Medicare and for the Medicare enrollees of the organization was alleviated when Humana took over opera tion of the plan, which continues operating to this day. However, the image of Medicare HMOs was tarnished by the IMC experi ence for many years afterwards.
Fits and Starts in the Late 1980s
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the number of Medicare-contracting HMOs began to decline (as did the number of operating HMOs in the U.S.). From the 1987 high of 161, the number of contract ing plans declined to 93 by December 1991. In 1989, for example, Prudential Insurance, which had applied to have 30 contracts across the U.S., scaled back its Medicare contracting to only a few plans. Enrollment continued its rise, however, reaching 1.4 million beneficiaries in risk plans by the end of 1991, even though the number of contracts was at its post-1985 low point in 1991.
During this period, relatively large num bers of Medicare beneficiaries were affect ed by contract terminations or service area reductions (under a new policy of the mid 1980s which allowed HMOs to choose which counties they wanted to include in their Medicare contracts among those counties where they otherwise operated). For the years 1987-1989, terminations affected an average of nearly 7 percent of enrollees each year (not including those affected by service area reductions).
Not All Milestones Are Legislative
With the managed care revolution of the mid-1990s, HMOs burgeoned in the private sector as well as the public sector. Medicare HMO enrollment doubled between 1993 and 1996 (to 4.1 million enrollees), just as enrollment overall in HMOs doubled from January 1993 to a January 1999 level of 81 million (Interstudy, 1999) . Between December 1994 and December 1998, Medicare risk HMO enrollment nearly tripled, rising to 6.1 mil lion beneficiaries, or over 15 percent of the Medicare population. Within areas in which Medicare HMOs were available, one in five beneficiaries had elected to enroll in a plan, while in the private employer mar ket, about one-third of individuals were cov ered by an HMO (Buckley and D'Amaro, 1998) . While in 1993 only about one-half of Medicare beneficiaries resided in a county in which a risk plan was available, the inter est in Medicare contracting expanded to such an extent that by 1998, 74 percent of beneficiaries had at least one Medicare plan available in their area.
Medicare+Choice
The most recent major legislative mile stone was the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA). It was heralded as the most signifi cant change in private plan contracting in the history of Medicare. The BBA intro duced major revisions in the types of pri vate plans that could have Medicare con tracts, the contracting standards to be applied, beneficiary enrollment rules, and payment rules. The BBA also finally introduced a Part C of Medicare, "Medicare+Choice (M+C)," a quarter of a century after the Nixon Administration's proposal to add Part C. Under Part C, new types of organizations included providersponsored organizations, preferred provider organizations, medical savings account plans (on a demonstration basis), private FFS plans (the first "defined contri bution" option, because there is no statuto ry limit on its Medicare premium), and religious fraternal benefit organizations.
Continuing to look for that perfect fit in the approach to payments, the BBA made a number of major changes in the method of computing Medicare capitation payments to health plans. The BBA introduced national/local blended rates, a payment floor for the lowest-paid counties, and a minimum update payment. Under the min imum update provision, all counties are guaranteed a payment increase of 2 per cent over the preceding year's base rates. Annual payment increases after 1997 would be based on an update factor that is the rate of increase in projected Medicare expenditures each year, less a statutorily specified reduction (as opposed to the AAPCC methodology, under which each county's rate of increase would be based on a projection of the actual incurred Medicare expenditures in the county for the year in question).
In general, historically lower-paid coun ties (which are less likely to have had Medicare managed care plans) would receive higher payment increases as a result of the BBA's payment floor and the phased-in national/local blended payment rate-attempting to address the Miami versus Minnesota issue of M+C benefits varying as a reflection of Medicare FFS payment rates. Many counties that histori cally had higher payment rates had their rate increases reduced by the BBA.
The BBA also reduced M+C capitation rates by phasing in the removal of direct and indirect medical education payments from M+C rates beginning in 1998, provid ing instead for phasing in direct payment of these "carved out" amounts to the hospi tals providing care to M+C enrollees.
The BBA applies a budget neutrality adjustment to the blended rates. The effect of this adjustment in 1998 and 1999, as well as in 2001, was to have payments at the "floor" level or at the minimum 2 percent update level for all counties. The BBA also requires that health status be used to adjust payments to M+C plans, in light of the evidence over the years of favorable selection in HMOs-i.e., enrollees tend to be healthier than average Medicare beneficiaries but plans are paid based on costs for an average population (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000a). HCFA chose to introduce the BBA risk adjustment methodology on a phased-in schedule, and the BBRA modified the phase-in schedule to more gradually phase in the share of payments that would be computed on a risk-adjusted basis.
Some of the BBA changes appear, to date, to have been more symbolic than practical, to repeat a phrase used about the 1972 amendments. Only one providersponsored organization contracted with Medicare after the BBA, and that organiza tion will terminate its contract at the end of 2000. One private FFS plan is operating, and there are preferred provider organiza tion applications pending. The BBA's repeal of the 50/50 rule has not resulted in any HMOs going into new areas as Medicare-only HMOs, and the payment floor and blended rates (when possible under the budget neutrality rules) have not resulted in increased access in rural areas.
Terminations in 1998-2000
For the 2001 contract year, over 900,000 Medicare beneficiaries-about 15 percent of all enrollees-will be affected by a plan ter mination or service area reduction. About 150,000 will not have access to another M+C plan (other than the private FFS plan in some areas). Overall, only 63 percent of Medicare beneficiaries will have access to an M+C coordinated care plan in 2001. In the preceding year, 327,000 enrollees were affected by terminations and service area reductions (5 percent of enrollees), with 79,000 left without an M+C plan available. In the preceding year, at the end of 1998, 407,000 enrollees were affected. For the first time since the beginning of the program, overall enrollment declined from one year to the next (December 1999 to January 2000, from 6.35 million to 6.19 million).
These changes may give one pause as to whether the BBA did the opposite of what it was intended to do (in terms of expand ing private health plan choices for benefi ciaries while also controlling Medicare expenditures). However, just as one could note that the increase in Medicare enroll ment that coincided with the managed care revolution cannot be traced to any particu lar change in Medicare, one might also argue that other factors besides the BBA changes explain the post-BBA downturn in enrollment trends among Medicare benefi ciaries and the leveling off of interest in Medicare on the part of HMOs and other private plans. The U.S. General Accounting Office, for example, argues as much (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1999; 2000) .
Murky Future
What the future holds is difficult to say, other than perhaps to say that these things-the insurance cycle, actions by Congress to control Medicare expendi tures-are cyclical (a redundancy in the case of the insurance cycle, except that some had claimed the insurance cycle had disappeared). It is probably wisest not to opine on this issue. Health policy analysts are notoriously bad at making predictions. When the HMO Act was enacted in 1973, the Nixon Administration announced a strategy calling for the development of 1,800 HMOs-a projection somewhat off the mark. To cite another example, in 1990, very few people would have predicted the managed care revolution, and the conse quent pre-eminent role to be played by managed care plans and the virtual disap pearance of FFS indemnity plans. Later, in the midst of the managed care revolution, perhaps few people would have thought that the future of managed care was not secure-its success at controlling costs would ensure that it would be the model for health care forever after, and its suc cess in attracting Medicare beneficiaries would continue indefinitely.
Loose Ends
A different way to approach the question of predicting the future is merely to recite what the past has left undone. The perfect fit in payment has not been achieved (but may be forever elusive-would it be through some competitive pricing approach?). Extending managed care to rural areas remains problematic, and matching the needs of certain populations with managed care plans is an issue (e.g., those with ESRD, the disabled). Perhaps, with time, other viable models of managed care or private health plans will be devel oped for Medicare as a result of the BBA. Thirty-five years just seems not to have been enough time to sort all this out, but as the history shows, people are at least aware of some of the issues worth ponder ing in Medicare managed care.
